Notes on Rosier Chapter 6

Rosier’s subtitle is “We Have a Way to Make Citizens of Them” The politics of Blackfeet Self-Determination, 1945-1952

If I were called upon to provide a different sub-title, it might be, “Raising teenaged people is not easy.” This chapter provides details about approaching independence and then pulling away from it, for quite different reasons and with an ever-changing cast of characters. “Go forward, go back, and wait now!” In Blackft the word for wait is kikah! Tasteless joke: a lot of people sure wanted to kick each other.

The first blow was that John Collier resigned in January, 1945, removing a trusted champion of Indians. Now the U.S. Congress, which wanted to send money for reconstruction to the war-devastated countries overseas, was not inclined to send money and sympathy to Indian tribes. By the end of this year, three Blackft political groups had formed:
1. Extreme terminationists led by Brian Connolly and Leo Kennerly, who wanted to just end all federal supervision.
2. Moderate terminationists like Joe Brown and George Pambrun, who favored gradually transferring federal functions to tribe, county and state.
3. Segregationists like James White Calf and Charles Reevis, who wanted continued federal oversight, mostly because they didn’t trust the Tribal Council. By now these men were in their seventies.

The returning veterans had a hard time accepting the restrictions on their ability to borrow or their treatment as less than able to make their own decisions.

Charles Heacock spent months trying to teach the Tribal Council people how to do modern business accounting and budgeting, but it was uphill work. Few could resist making exceptions in emergency situations and, if it would make a big fuss, not writing down the sums loaned, so as to postpone trouble. Most of the funds available had been put into livestock. The figures continued to improve: bigger herds, more families owning herds, better profits from those herds. In 1950 the extension staff estimated that 145 families were self-supporting. Loans were being repaid. But as people felt more pride, they were not so willing to accept extension oversight and advice.

The tribe wanted to help choose the superintendent of the agency. The Office of Indian Affairs shrugged them off, but hired Freal McBride, a popular superintendent of Browning schools. Unfortunately, he died shortly after in a car crash. The next agent was Warren O’Hara, who was less trusted and who got into a war with Brian Connolly over the trustworthiness of the Tribal Council. Now the kind of animosity that had been directed at the Agency was re-targeted at the Tribal Council.

In 1946 Peter Vielle, a fifty-year-old half-blood (some say Cree), spearheaded an organization that wanted all relief operations to be shouldered by the federal government so that all profit would be free for individual distribution. This played into the hands of William Zimmerman with Indian Affairs, who declared that with the Tribe’s income from oil money, they were morally obligated to provide welfare as well as law and order. In January 1948 the Tribal Council contracted with Glacier and Pondera counties to administer welfare under federal supervision.

Rosier asserts “the government essentially used Blackfeet money held in the U.S. Treasury to finance the Marshall Plan because Congress’s $75,000 cap on all Indian withdrawals from the Treasury amounted to appropriation by fiat.” Blackfeet who had just sacrificed years of their lives or who had lost family members felt betrayed by this. When the Blackft Council was prevented from distributing as much as they wanted to by a cap on per capita, they simply re-defined the rest of the money as welfare and distributed it anyway. Sauce for the gander...

In 1947 the Tribal Council unanimously passed Resolution No. 20, which requested the termination of Secretary of the Interior oversight of, among other things:
Section 5(b): leases, permits and contracts referring to tribal land
Section 5(f): business contracts in excess of ten thousand dollars
Section 5(h): terms for the deposit of tribal funds
Section 8: individual per capita payments of more than one hundred dollars or distributions that totaled more than “one-half of the accrued surplus.”

This had to be voted on by the Tribe as a whole, with a minimum of 30% participation, voted for by a majority. The Secretary of the Interior could veto the election, but the Council could hold a referendum. Then the the Nation as a whole could approve the referendum if they had the approval of two-thirds of eligible voters.

Zimmerman’s strategy was to initiate an audit of the Tribe, which “revealed” all sorts of corruption and failure of accountability. What he mostly wanted to protect was Interior control of section 5(b) No. 2, relating to oil and range leasing. O’Hara, the agent, didn’t support the resolution because he felt that if the Tribe wouldn’t take charge and finance their own welfare and judicial affairs, they weren’t mature enough to manage their finances.

In January 1948, a new council, headed by Henry Magee, came to office and withdrew the resolution. By August 1949, they were angry enough at the Interior’s heavy hand to go dig it back up. This time the Secretary of the Interior, Oscar Chapman, said that they could proceed with the election if it were absolutely fair and clean. By 1950, everyone was angry with the Council, accusing them of the usual crimes. In the confused situation the referendum was split out into five referendums, one on each item. Four were rejected by at least 65% of the voters. The only one that passed was the removal of caps on per capita. In the Council election on the same day, the entire council was replaced. George Pambrun and Joe Brown were brought back and two women were elected. Eighty candidates ran.

Probably some voters were influenced by the short-lived tribal cooperative store, which cost a hundred thousand dollars to set up but never showed a profit, mostly because the co-op members thought that since it was “their” store, they didn’t have to pay for anything. Also, salaries were high. Others pointed to “hay loans,” some of which were handed out to people who had no livestock. 1950 was an unusually harsh winter and the per capita meant to help fell short for lack of funds: some were paid and some struggled to Browning in a blizzard to discover they were not. The Council ignored the necessity of keeping books. They felt they were being doubted and they would not take advice, but they had very little experience in the discipline and skills necessary. Even after the records were set up by outside auditors, the Council either invented their own systems or simply ignored the obligation.

By now there were several national “pan-Indian” political bodies. Felix Cohen was a link to the Association on American Indian Affairs, whose president was Oliver La Farge. These people were willing and able to take on Indian Agency employees who were active in local politics in an unseemly way. The Cold War had begun and the US Government had learned to be covert. Rosier points out that the Blackft Nation and Guatemala were about equidistant from Washington, D.C. Once again the definition of “tribe” was slipping around, now moving away from blood quantum to “cultural” or “social” “Indian-identified.” Cohen acquired a local associate, attorney Cedor Aronow. New pressure for Council reform came from Council members themselves, who hoped to reduce expenses. Walter Wetzel was the new Chair.

The main outcome of the energy expended on this election was that it educated a lot of people about what was possible and what was involved. It also revealed the centrality of oil to the tribe -- oil was the “new buffalo.” But oil can be used up.